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2Introduction
This paper proposes the view that interbank markets are tiered, operating in a hierarchical
fashion where lower-tier banks deal with each other primarily through money center banks. It
may seem peculiar to focus on intermediation between banks; intermediation is traditionally
regarded as the activity banks perform on behalf of non-banks, such as depositors and ￿rms
(Gurley and Shaw (1956), Diamond (1984)). The notion that banks build yet another layer of
intermediation between themselves goes largely unnoticed in the banking literature. Yet such
hierarchical structures appear to be common in ￿nancial markets well beyond banking.
The interbank market is often modeled in the literature as a centralized exchange in which
banks smooth liquidity shocks (e.g. Ho and Saunders (1985), Bhattacharya and Gale (1987),
or Freixas and Holthausen (2005)). In reality, the interbank market is decentralized: deals
are struck bilaterally between pairs of banks, not against a central counterparty (Stigum and
Crescenzi (2007)). This de￿ning feature of over-the-counter markets is known to give rise to
intermediaries (Du¢ e et al. (2005)). While some recent models recognize the bilateral nature
of the interbank market (e.g. Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas et al. (2000), and Leitner (2005)),
the presence of intermediaries, and hence the tiered character of this market, has not been
analyzed in any rigorous way. Yet the need to understand market structure was highlighted by
the ￿nancial crisis and by macroprudential concepts such as "too-connected-to-fail".
This paper de￿nes interbank tiering and provides a network characterization founded on in-
termediation. The interbank market is tiered when some banks intermediate between banks
that do not extend credit among themselves. We capture this market structure by formulating
a core-periphery model and devise a procedure for ￿tting the model to real-world networks.
This can be thought of as running a regression, but instead of estimating a parameter that
achieves the best linear ￿t, one determines the optimal set of core banks that achieves the best
structural match between the observed network and a tiered structure of the same dimension.
We show that our procedure delivers a core which is a strict subset of intermediaries, excluding
those banks that play no essential role in holding together the interbank market. It also yields
a measure of distance that aggregates the structural inconsistencies between the observed net-
work and the nearest tiering model. We use this statistic to test formally whether the extent of
tiering observed in the interbank market is signi￿cantly greater than what emerges in networks
formed by random processes.
Our empirical work relies on comprehensive Bundesbank statistics, which we use to construct
the network of bilateral interbank positions between more than 2000 banks. While most banks
simultaneously borrow and lend in the interbank market, we ￿nd that the optimal core com-
prises only 2.7% of such intermediaries. Tiering thus delivers a strong re￿nement of the concept
of intermediation. Throughout the available time span (1999Q1￿2007Q4), the size and com-
1position of the optimal core remain stable. This supports the view that we have identi￿ed
a truly structural feature, one that has hitherto only been described in qualitative terms us-
ing aggregate data (Ehrmann and Worms (2004), Upper and Worms (2004)). Moreover, we
show that the extent of tiering observed in the German interbank market cannot be replicated
by standard random processes of network formation. The German interbank network ￿ts the
core-periphery model eight times better than Erd￿s-RØnyi random graphs and about two times
better than scale-free networks of the same dimension and density.
If tiering is not the result of random processes but of purposeful behavior, there must be
economic reasons why the banking system organizes itself around a core of money center banks.
The ￿nal part of the paper explores this idea by testing whether balance sheet variables predict
which kind of banks form the core. The probit regressions con￿rm that (only) large banks tend
to belong to the core, even though economies of scale and scope play a limited role. Other
bank-speci￿c variables, such as systemic importance, similarly predict reliably the way a bank
chooses to position itself in the interbank network. We also show that the core of the banking
system can be predicted by means of a regression that uses only balance sheet variables, which
is helpful since most countries do not collect bilateral interbank data.
Our work makes several contributions. First, based on comprehensive statistics on the German
banking system, we show that the interbank market looks very di⁄erent from what banking
theory imagines. The market is not a centralized exchange, but a sparse network, centered
around a tight set of core banks, which intermediate between numerous smaller banks in the
periphery. This raises the question of why ￿nancial intermediaries build yet another layer of
intermediation between themselves. Moreover, the persistence of this hierarchical structure
calls into question the common assumption that random liquidity shocks are a su¢ cient basis
for explaining interbank activity.
Second, we make novel use of network concepts that might be of broader interest in the area of
industrial organization. Our approach allows us to measure how far a decentralized market is
from a particular benchmark structure. To make a structural quality of interest amenable to
quantitative treatment, we formulate a procedure ￿based on blockmodeling techniques ￿for
￿tting a theoretical structure to an observed network. We solve this combinatorial problem by
a fast optimization algorithm and devise a new method of hypothesis testing that tests whether
the structural quality under study can be expected to arise randomly. The procedure ￿ts any
observed network and can be adapted to other theoretical market structures. Our choice of a
speci￿c core-periphery structure is based on economic reasoning and delivers a re￿nement of
intermediation. This constrasts with other papers that often report network measures unrelated
to any concepts in banking and ￿nance.
Finally, the econometric part of the paper bridges two largely distinct literatures on individual
banks and on network formation. In line with the view that di⁄erent kinds of banks build
2systematically di⁄erent patterns of linkages, we ￿nd that bank balance sheets reliably predict
which banks position themselves in the core and which remain in the periphery. In other words,
the observed network structure is the result of purposeful behavior, which is driven by factors
that are re￿ ected in bank balance sheets. This link could be of practical use for central banks
and regulators wishing to study their domestic interbank networks, for it provides a structured
alternative to the entropy method usually employed when no bilateral data are available. More
generally, this link ￿between banking-speci￿c features and network structure ￿is a promising
avenue for a better understanding of the formation of ￿nancial networks.
1 Tiering in the interbank market
This section provides a network characterization of the concept of interbank tiering. It then
develops a procedure for ￿tting the model to real-world networks and implements it through
a fast algorithm. The concepts are illustrated by a simple example, and the procedure and
hypothesis tests are applied to the large German interbank market. But ￿rst we motivate and
de￿ne interbank tiering.
Note that in de￿ning tiering in terms of interbank credit relations, we focus on a meaningful
economic choice. Interbank activity is based on relationships (Cocco et al. (2009)). In order
to lend, a bank typically has to run creditworthiness checks (e.g. Broecker (1990)), the cost of
which will limit the number of counterparties. As such, a credit exposure is more likely to re￿ ect
an economic relationship than many other transactions, such as the submission of a payment.
The payments literature uses the term tiering in related sense, to describe access to payment and
settlement systems (CPSS (2003), Kahn and Roberds (2009)): in some systems, only few banks
are direct members, and other banks have to transact through members to settle payments with
each other (e.g. CHAPS in the United Kingdom).1 However, the routing of payments (on behalf
of customers) di⁄ers from the extension of credit between banks. Exposures, unlike payments,
do not cease to exist after they have been made, so the structure of the resulting network is of
greater relevance for ￿nancial stability.
1.1 From intermediation to tiering
Banks may rely on intermediaries for a variety of functions. One is liquidity distribution, the
process of channeling funds from surplus banks to de￿cit banks (e.g. Niehans and Hewson
(1976), Bruche and Suarez (2010)). Another is risk management: banks may place interbank
deposits for purposes of diversi￿cation, risk-sharing, and insurance (e.g. Allen and Gale (2000),
1This literature focuses on the determinants of membership (Kahn and Roberds (2009) and Galbiati and
Giansante (2009)). In practice, this involves legal and technological factors as much as economic considerations.
3Leitner (2005)). Banks may also take and place funds in di⁄erent maturities to alter their
maturity pro￿le (e.g. Diamond (1991), Hellwig (1994)). For these and other functions (includ-
ing custodian or settlement services), banks rely on intermediaries in ways that give rise to
interbank credit exposures.
De￿nition 1: Interbank intermediation. An interbank intermediary is a bank acting both
as lender and borrower in the interbank market.
This is the standard concept of ￿nancial intermediation, applied more narrowly to the banking
market. The set of interbank intermediaries can be identi￿ed from existing banking data as
the subset of banks recording both claims and liabilities vis-￿-vis other banks on their balance
sheet. Our concept of interbank tiering describes the interbank structure that arises when some
banks intermediate between banks that do not extend credit among themselves.
De￿nition 2: Interbank tiering. Some banks (the top tier) lend to each other and inter-
mediate between other banks, which participate in the interbank market only via these top-tier
banks.
An interbank market is tiered when it is organized in layers, which we call tiers to evoke the
hierarchical nature of the concept ￿in contrast with a "￿ at" structure without intermediaries.
This can be expressed in terms of bilateral relations between top-tier and lower-tier banks:
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
1. Top-tier banks lend to each other,
2. lower-tier banks do not lend to each other,
3. top-tier banks lend to (some) lower-tier banks, and
4. top-tier banks borrow from (some) lower-tier banks.
(1)
This formulation conveys several important points. Tiering is a structural property of the
system, not a property of any individual bank. Furthermore, tiering is a network concept: the
banks in the system are partitioned into two sets based on their bilateral relations with each
other. At the same time, unlike other network concepts, tiering is founded on an economic
concept that is central to banking and ￿nance, intermediation. In fact, tiering is a re￿nement
of intermediation: top-tier banks are special intermediaries that play a central role in holding
together the interbank market.
Before developing a formal characterization, we provide a simple illustration of interbank tiering.
4Example. Consider the left panel of Figure 1 (the other panels will be discussed later).
Banks fD;F;Hg are either lenders or borrowers, not both. The set of intermediaries thus
consists of the remaining banks fA;B;C;E;Gg. Bank C, for instance, intermediates from
lender F to borrower H. It takes a chain of banks (involving A and C) to intermediate from
D to H. The top tier consists of a strict subset of intermediaries, namely fA;B;Cg shown
in solid color, while the remaining banks constitute the lower tier. For this partition of banks,
the relations within and between the two sets exactly match the relations listed in (1). Banks
E and G are intermediaries, but they belong to the lower tier because they are not su¢ ciently
connected with other banks to qualify for the top tier (where they would violate the relations
1, 3 and 4). This re￿ects the fact that these two banks play no role in connecting lower-tier
banks to the interbank market.
[Figure 1: Stylized example of an interbank market]
This example illustrates a perfectly tiered interbank structure. In reality, the presence of tiering
will be a matter of degree. Much of what follows serves to develop methods that formalize how
to think about the distance between real-world networks and perfectly tiered structures.
1.2 Network characterization of tiering
This section develops a structural representation for our de￿nition of interbank tiering. This
will serve as a benchmark model against which empirical interbank market structures can be
assessed. A network consists of a set of nodes that are connected by links. Taking each bank as
a node, the interbank positions between them constitute the network, which can be represented
as a square matrix of dimension n equal to the number of banks in the system. The typical
element (i;j) of this matrix represents a gross interbank claim, the value of credit extended by
bank i to bank j. Row i thus shows bank i￿ s bilateral interbank claims, and column i shows the
same bank￿ s interbank liabilities to each of the banks in the system. The diagonal elements (i;i)
are zero when treating banks as consolidated entities (with intragroup exposures netted out).
O⁄-diagonal elements are positive, or zero in the absence of a bilateral position. Real-world
interbank data typically give rise to directed, sparse and valued networks.2 Since the concept
of tiering is about the structure of linkages, we code the presence or absence of a link by 1 or 0,
as is common practice in network analysis. Thus, non-symmetric binary matrices will be used
to represent the model and the empirical interbank network in our application.
2The networks are directed, because a claim of bank i on j (an asset of i) is not the same as a claim of j
on i (a liability of i). They are sparse as only a small share of the n(n ￿ 1) potential bilateral links are used at
any point in time. Finally, interbank networks are valued because interbank positions are reported in monetary
values, as opposed to 1 or 0 indicating the presence or absence of a claim.
5We characterize a perfectly tiered structure in the shape of a network. The bilateral relations
(1) consistent with our de￿nition of tiering are mapped into a matrix, M, with top-tier banks
ordered ￿rst. For reasons that will become clear shortly, we shall call the set of top-tier banks
"the core" (C), and the set of lower-tier banks "the periphery" (P). The nodes within each tier
are equivalent with respect to the nature of their linkages with other nodes. Hence it su¢ ces










The block denoted by CC ("core to core") speci￿es how top-tier banks relate to other core
banks: when they all lend to each other, as speci￿ed in (1), CC is a block of ones (ignoring
the zero diagonal). Likewise, periphery banks not lending to each other makes PP a square
matrix of zeros. Core banks lending to some banks in the periphery means that CP must be
"row regular", meaning that it contains at least one link in every row. Similarly, when all core
banks borrow from at least one periphery bank, PC is a "column regular" matrix with at least
one 1 in every column.
Our de￿nition of tiering therefore translates into the choice and location of speci￿c block types.
(Other theories would require di⁄erent block types, but our procedure for estimating the implied
market structure would still apply.) The blockmodel of tiering consists of a complete block
(denoted 1) and a zero block (0) on the diagonal, which speci￿es relations within the tiers, and
two o⁄-diagonal blocks specifying relations between the tiers: CP must be row-regular (RR),










This model speci￿es only the market structure ￿the size of M and its blocks remains open, be-
cause the number and identity of banks allocated to each tier will be determined endogenously.
If c banks end up in the core, then the block CP, for instance, will be a matrix of dimension
c￿(n￿c). One easily veri￿es that our simple example of tiering (Figure 1, left panel) conforms
3Blockmodels are theoretical reductions of networks and have a long tradition in the analysis of social roles
(Wasserman and Faust (1994)).
4These terms come from the literature on generalized blockmodeling (Doreian et al. (2005)). A column-
regular block, CR, has each column (but not necessarily each row) covered by at least one 1; the RR block has
each row covered by at least one 1.
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Our network characterization of tiering is a re￿nement of the general core-periphery model in
sociology. In social network analysis, this label is attached to any network with a dense cohesive
core and a sparse periphery (Borgatti and Everett (1999)), as re￿ ected in the diagonal blocks
1 and 0 in (2). However, the core-periphery model in this literature does not specify how the
core and periphery are related to each other; the blocks on the o⁄-diagonal could be of any
type and are often ignored in the analysis (as recommended by Borgatti and Everett (1999)).
In building on intermediation, our model of tiering does specify how the core and periphery
should be related: core banks borrow from, and lend to, at least one bank in the periphery; they
intermediate between banks in the periphery and thereby hold together the entire interbank
market.
This particular focus on how the core and periphery are related is based on an economic
rationale that seems appropriate for the interbank market. Core banks are in the market at
all times and incur interbank positions with important counterparties in the normal course of
business (hence CC = 1). Periphery banks, on the other hand, might only lend, or borrow, or
might not participate in the interbank market at all when they have no de￿cits or risks to cover
at that moment. It would be too restrictive to require that every bank in the periphery has
to be connected;5 but the periphery as a whole should certainly be linked to the core, or else
there would not be a single cohesive interbank market.6 The choice of row- and column-regular
blocks on the o⁄-diagonal of M ￿nds the right balance by placing strong restrictions only on
core banks: every core bank must be connected to at least one bank in the periphery, but the
5This would be the result of de￿ning CP and PC as complete (1) or regular blocks. A regular block has
at least one 1 in every row and column, implying that every periphery bank lends to, and borrows from, some
bank in the core (which would make all banks in the system intermediaries).
6This degenerate case of an unconnected periphery is permitted in the weak core-periphery model (with CP
and PC zero blocks) discussed by Borgatti and Everett (1999)).
7converse need not hold.
1.3 Testing for structure
We now focus on how to determine the extent to which an observed real-world network exhibits
tiering. How does one test for the entire structure in a network? Visual inspection is instructive
but inconclusive for large networks, and traditional network statistics do not relate to any
underlying model, tiered or otherwise. Our approach is to compare the network of interest
with the model in terms of a measure of distance that aggregates the structural inconsistencies
between them. If the observed network and the best-￿tting tiering model remain at great
distance from each other, then the network does not have a tiered structure.
We formulate a procedure for ￿tting the model M to an observed network N. This can be
thought of as running a regression, but instead of estimating the parameter ￿ that achieves the
best linear ￿t, one determines the optimal set of core banks that achieves the best structural
match between N and M, a perfectly tiered structure. We show that the solution has the
desirable property that the core is a strict subset of all intermediaries. Finding this solution
is a large-scale problem in combinatorial optimization for which we develop a fast algorithm.
We then evaluate the degree of tiering in the observed network by testing the goodness of ￿t
against the distribution obtained from ￿tting random networks for which tiering is not expected
to emerge.
Fitting the model to a network
The tiering model M serves as the benchmark for assessing the extent of tiering inherent in an
observed interbank network N. These two objects have to be made comparable. The observed
network N is a square matrix of dimension n equal to the number of banks, with Nij = 1 if
bank i lends to bank j 6= i, and Nij = 0 otherwise. The model M, on the other hand, is a
generic structure that embodies the relations in (1) for any dimension. The ￿tting procedure
involves two steps: ￿rst, we de￿ne a measure of distance between the network and the model
M of the same dimension, using (2) as the matching criterion; then, we solve for the optimal
(distance-minimizing) partition of banks into core and periphery. Working with the optimal
￿t takes care of the problem that tiering is a qualitative concept that does not depend on the
exact size of the core (or periphery) as long as there are two tiers.
The measure of distance we adopt, following the generalized blockmodeling approach of Doreian
et al. (2005), is a total error score. It aggregates the number of inconsistencies between
the observed network and the chosen model. Consider an arbitrary partition where c banks
are considered for the core, leaving (n ￿ c) banks in the periphery. Denote the set of core
8banks by C; ordering core banks ￿rst (and rearranging N by permutation accordingly) makes
C = f1;2;:::;cg: This partition divides the observed matrix N into four blocks, and the model
M predicts how each block should look in a perfectly tiered network of the same dimension. In
particular, the top tier CC should be a complete block 1 of size c2, so any missing link (outside
the diagonal) presents an inconsistency with the model (2), as one core bank has no exposure to
another. Likewise, any observed link within the periphery (PP) constitutes an error relative to
M, as periphery banks should not transact directly with each other in a perfectly tiered market.
Errors in the o⁄-diagonal blocks penalize zero rows (columns), because these are inconsistent
with row-regularity (column-regularity, respectively): a zero row in CP indicates that a core
bank fails to lend to any of the (n ￿ c) banks in the periphery, violating a de￿ning feature of
core banks. Similarly, a zero column in PC shows that the corresponding core bank does not
borrow at all from the periphery, producing as many errors as there are banks in the periphery































The total error score aggregates the errors across the four blocks.7 We normalize the error score
by the total number of links in the observed network,
e =






The total error score is our measure of distance; it is a function since every possible partition
into two tiers is associated with a particular value of e. Denote this function by e(C), where C
stands for the set of banks under consideration for the core. The optimal core, C￿, is the set(s)
of banks that produces the smallest distance to the model M of the same dimension,
C
￿ = argmin e(C)
= fC 2 ￿ j e(C) ￿ e(c) 8c 2 ￿g; (5)
where ￿ denotes all strict and non-empty subsets of the population f1;2;:::;ng. Intuitively,
the expression (5) determines the number and identity of banks in N that are core banks in
the sense of the interbank tiering model. The following example illustrates in a simple way
how structural inconsistencies between N and M are measured by the distance function and
minimized by the optimal core.
7The aggregation of errors can be adapted to cases in which one type of error is more consequential than
another. E.g. multiplying (E12 +E21) by a parameter below unity deemphasizes the relation between core and
periphery; multiplying E11 by a number above unity will yield a solution with a smaller, tightly connected core.
As no theoretical priors on intermediation suggest otherwise, we use the equally weighted aggregation of errors,
in line with the overall dimension of the network.
9Example. Consider Figure 1, where the left panel shows our earlier example of a tiered
structure (M). The other panels depict examples of networks that are not perfectly tiered
(N). In the middle panel, suppose we knew that banks fA;B;Cg are good candidates for
the core. If so, however, we observe that one core bank (B) does not lend to another core
bank C, and periphery bank D lends directly to another (H). Accordingly, the matrix (3)
yields one error in each of the diagonal blocks CC and PP. As no other partition attains a
lower error score, fA;B;Cg remains the optimal core, as it minimizes the total error score to
e(C￿) = 2=13.
Suppose we conjecture that fA;B;Cg also forms the core of the network in the right panel.
We observe that one putative core bank does not lend to the periphery at all; this immediately
generates 5 ￿tting errors in block CP for C￿ s failure to lend to any of the 5 banks in the
periphery. Moving C to the periphery instead causes a single error (its continued link with
periphery bank F), in addition to the existing error (D lending to H). The distance between
the network and the model can thus be reduced by placing bank C in the periphery, i.e. by
considering a tiering model with only two nodes in the core (and six in the periphery). The
optimal ￿t yields two errors in the (enlarged) periphery, none in the (reduced) core fA;Bg,
and none again in the o⁄-diagonal blocks, for a total score of e(C￿) = 2=12. The new core
excludes bank C, which obviously remains an intermediary, illustrating that the core comprises
only those intermediaries that intermediate between banks in the periphery, as required by
De￿nition 2.
Real-world network are far more complex than this example suggests, with structures that may
be arbitrarily far removed from that of a tiered market. This makes it essential to understand
the properties of the optimal ￿t and to develop an e¢ cient procedure for arriving at this
solution. We now show that the solution preserves the main features illustrated in this simple
example.
Properties of the solution
The procedure of minimizing the distance between model M and network N delivers the optimal
partition of banks into core and periphery. Based on our de￿nition of distance (3)-(4), the
solution has the following properties:
Proposition 1:
(a) The presence of intermediaries is necessary and su¢ cient for a core-periphery structure:
(i) A network without intermediaries has no core.
(ii) A network with intermediaries has a core (and a periphery under one weak condition).
(b) The core is a (strict) subset of the set of intermediaries:
(i) All core banks are intermediaries, but
(ii) Intermediaries are not part of the core if they do not lend to, or do not borrow from,
the periphery.
10Proof: see Appendix A. The ￿rst property relates to existence and shows that the distance-
minimizing procedure can identify a core-periphery structure in virtually all networks. The
su¢ cient condition for a core is the presence of at least one intermediary. A periphery always
exists under the weak (and su¢ cient) condition that the network contains either unattached
banks, or one missing bilateral link. This is intuitive, since an interbank market in which every
bank lends to all other banks, as in Allen and Gale (2000), cannot be regarded as tiered but must
be viewed as "￿ at", since banks are all equal in their connection patterns. The core-periphery
model can be ￿tted under conditions that are satis￿ed by all realistic interbank networks.
The second property shows that our concept of tiering delivers a useful re￿nement on the
concept of intermediation: the core is a strict subset of all intermediaries. Core banks are
special intermediaries that connect banks in the periphery. While this property is, of course,
in line with our de￿nition of tiering (and thus embodied in M), the result states that this
property carries over one-for-one to the solution when ￿tting M to an observed network N.
This is remarkable, because one would expect any statistical ￿tting procedure on a large network
to produce some errors in every block of (3). However, the o⁄-diagonal blocks governing the
relations between core and periphery have error scores of exactly zero. Consequently, the error
score (4) at the optimum takes the simple form
e(C
￿) =





We have encountered these properties of the solution in the example above, where o⁄-diagonal
errors were zero and the optimal core fA;Bg was a strict subset of all intermediaries fA;B;C;E;Gg.
The traditional core-periphery model, which disregards o⁄-diagonal blocks (Borgatti and Everett
(1999)), would have retained bank C in the core (in Figure 1, right panel), even though C no
longer intermediates between banks in the periphery.
Implementation
Fitting the model to a real-world network is a large-scale problem in combinatorial optimiza-
tion. Only for very small networks can the solution be found by exhaustive search. In our
example with 8 banks, for instance, computing the total error scores for each of the 28 = 256
possible partitions con￿rms that fA;Bg is indeed the (unique) solution that minimizes the error
function. This brute-force approach becomes infeasible for larger networks. A medium-sized
banking system of some 250 banks already requires on the order of 1078 possible subsets (2n)
to be evaluated for determining the optimal core. The problem of ￿nding an optimal subset
￿which our paper shares with Kirman et al. (2007) and Ballester et al. (2010) ￿is NP-hard.
The computational complexity of such problems rises exponentially with n, so that they can-
not be solved by exhaustive search. The goal of ￿tting the model to realistic networks, such
11as the German interbank market with close to 2000 active banks, calls for a more pragmatic
procedure.
Our implementation thus relies on a sequential optimization algorithm, which follows closely the
switching logic employed in our proof of Proposition 1. An initial random partition is evaluated
and improved upon by moving banks between the core and periphery until the total error score
(4) can no longer be reduced. The greedy version of our algorithm follows the steepest descent,
switching from one tier to another the bank that contributes most to the error score at each
iteration. To avoid running into local optima, a second algorithm employs simulated annealing,
which allows for a degree of randomness when moving banks, which declines monotonically as
the optimum is being approached. One way to test whether the procedure returns a global
optimum is by inspecting the associated E, since we know from Proposition 1 that a genuine
solution necessarily comes with a diagonal error matrix. Appendix B describes the robustness
checks we performed to ascertain that the procedure converges on a global optimum. The
main programming challenge consisted of reducing the algorithm￿ s polynomial running time
from order n3 to n1. This made the algorithm su¢ ciently fast for the repeated applications
necessary for hypothesis testing.
Hypothesis test against random networks
Having shown how to ￿t the model, we address the issue of signi￿cance: how can one evaluate
the extent to which the observed network exhibits tiering? The closer the network resembles
a tiered structure, the lower will be the error score (6). For a formal test, one must compare
the distance between the network and the model to some benchmark. Selecting a benchmark,
however, is not straightforward since we are assessing a qualitative feature relating to market
structure. Moreover, it would be questionable ￿as in econometrics ￿to change, without a
theoretical basis, the underlying model only to improve the statistical ￿t. It is easy to reduce
the total error score by choice of a weaker model, for instance by replacing the complete block 1
in (2) by a (more accommodative) regular block.8 Such an ad hoc change in the structure would
undermine the theoretical arguments advanced in Section 1.2, which led to this particular model.
We therefore adopt a di⁄erent strategy for evaluating signi￿cance.9
8Model selection remains an underexplored area in blockmodeling. Doreian et al. (2005) provide no clear
guidance, although they rightly caution against selecting among block types to minimize the number of structural
inconsistencies.
9Our approach of comparing a network to a speci￿c model contrasts with the maximum likelihood method
developed by Copic et al. (2009), which ￿nds the partition with the highest probability of producing the
observed network. (Wetherilt et al. (2009) apply this method to the 13 banks observed in the UK large-value
payment system CHAPS.) In contrast to our approach of ￿tting an underlying model, their method speci￿es
the likeliest community structure, de￿ned as groups of nodes more likely to connect within than across groups.
However, community structure di⁄ers from our core-periphery notion: periphery banks are in the lower tier
precisely because they are unlikely to connect to each other.
12In a ￿rst step, we assess whether a tiering model is worth ￿tting at all. Recall that our measure
of distance (4)-(6) normalizes the aggregate error by the total number of links in the observed
network, ￿￿Nij. This is also the maximum error under the alternative hypothesis that the
network comprises only a periphery. The minimum distance e(C￿) can therefore be used in
a basic test, similar in spirit to an F-test of joint signi￿cance which tests whether it is worth
including regressors at all.10 If e(C￿) ￿ 1, then there is no value in ￿tting a tiering model:
doing so generates more structural inconsistencies than does a "￿ at" model with a periphery
alone. In that case there is no evidence of a core standing out as a separate tier.11 We require
that e(C￿) attain a value well below unity to proceed.
In the second step, our strategy is to vary the data rather than the model: we test the total error
score against the Monte Carlo distribution function from a data-generating process in which
tiering is not expected to emerge. In particular, the error e(C￿) associated with the observed
network N is tested against the error distribution obtained by ￿tting simulated networks where
links are formed by exogenous statistical processes. The standard classes are random graphs
introduced by Erd￿s and RØnyi and scale-free networks popularized by Albert and BarabÆsi
and widely observed in the natural sciences (Newman et al. (2006)):
￿ A random graph is obtained by connecting any two nodes with a ￿xed and independent
probability p. Any realization of such a network also has an expected density of p. A
node can be expected to have a degree, or number of links, of p(n￿1) on each side in the
case of a directed network. The expected degree distribution around this characteristic
value is Binomial, converging to Poisson for large n.
￿ A scale-free network, on the other hand, has no characteristic scale: nodes with a lower
degree are proportionately more likely than nodes with k times that degree, for any k.
The degree distribution thus follows a power law. One statistical process giving rise
to scale-free networks is known as preferential attachment, whereby new nodes attach
to existing nodes with a probability proportional to the latters￿degrees. This formation
process tends to produce a few highly connected hubs, suggesting that scale-free networks
match interbank networks more closely than do random graphs.
Random and scale-free models are not hierarchical in nature (Ravasz and BarabÆsi (2003)).
The purely statistical nature of these network formation processes is at odds with the idea that
banks, by purposeful economic choice, organize themselves around a core of intermediaries,
giving rise to interbank tiering. We therefore generate 1000 random networks of the same
10This test requires no distribution, since the observed network comprises the full population (not only a
sample) of nodes.
11The other side of the test (a "￿ at" model with only a core) can be disregarded, except in the unusual case
where the density of the observed network exceeds 50%.
13dimension and density as the observed network N, and ￿t the model M to every realization.
This allows us to trace out an empirical distribution function Fe for the error score in an
environment where tiering occurs only by chance. We say that N exhibits a signi￿cant degree
of tiering if the associated test statistic e(C￿) is closer to zero than the bottom percentile of
the distribution function found for random networks,
Reject H0 if: e(C
￿) < Fe(0:01):
This signi￿cance test can be conducted separately for each class of random networks, Erd￿s-
RØnyi and scale-free. It can also be understood as rejecting the hypothesis that networks formed
by standard random processes would produce the extent of tiering observed in N. As tiering is
not expected to arise in such networks, it must be the result of incentives of banks for linking
to each other in this particular way. Following our application, we explore this direction in the
￿nal section.
2 Application to the German banking system
2.1 Constructing the interbank network
We employ a set of comprehensive banking statistics known as the ￿Gross- und Millionenkredit-
statistik￿(statistics on large loans and concentrated exposures). The data are compiled by the
Evidenzzentrale der Deutschen Bundesbank. According to the Banking Act of 1998, ￿nancial
institutions located in Germany must report on a quarterly basis each counterparty to whom
they have extended credit in the amount of at least e1.5 million or 10% of their liable capital.
If either threshold is exceeded at any time during the quarter, the lender reports outstanding
claims (of any maturity) as they stand at the end of the quarter. From these reports, the Bun-
desbank assembles the central credit register, which is employed by reporting institutions for
monitoring borrower indebtedness and by the authorities for monitoring individual exposures
and the overall ￿nancial system.
The nature of these data presents several advantages. Claims are reported with a full counter-
party breakdown vis-￿-vis thousands of banks and ￿rms. The bilateral positions are therefore
directly observed and need not be estimated as in many other studies.12 This makes it legiti-
mate to apply network methods. Second, positions are quoted in monetary values (in millions
of euros), indicating both the presence and strength of bilateral links. As the concept of tiering
12Bilateral interbank positions often have to be either reconstructed from payment ￿ ows (e.g. Fur￿ne (2003),
Bech and Atalay (2010), and Wetherilt et al. (2009)), or estimated from balance sheet data using entropy
methods (Upper and Worms (2004), Boss et al. (2004)). Mistrulli (2007) documents the resulting bias when
estimating contagion (see Degryse et al. (2009) for a survey). More importantly for our purposes, the entropy
method spreads linkages so evenly that essential qualitative features of the network structure would disappear.
14is about the structure of linkages, however, the monetary values are used here only to indicate
the presence of a credit exposure. Third, the data are available on a quarterly basis since
1999Q1, which allows us to observe the structure of the network over time.
We gathered all reported bilateral positions between banks to construct the interbank network.
To capture relations between legal entities (rather than internal markets), we consolidated banks
by ownership at the level of the Konzern (bank holding company), thereby purging intragroup
positions. We also excluded cross-border linkages in order obtain a self-contained network
(since further linkages of counterparties abroad remain unobserved). The resulting network
is represented as a square matrix N with 4.76 million cells containing the bilateral interbank
exposures among 2182 banks (including subsidiaries of foreign banks) located in Germany.
Some basic statistics convey a ￿rst impression. The German banking system is one of the
largest in the world, with assets totaling e7.6 trillion ($11 trillion) at the end of 2007. Re-
￿ ecting the key role of the interbank market, consolidated domestic interbank positions sum to
e1.056 trillion, making up a sizeable share of banks￿balance sheets. Even after Konzern-level
consolidation, the number of active banks in the interbank market varies between 1760 to 1802
for our sample period. This set comprises, on average, 40 private credit banks (Kreditbanken),
400 savings banks (Sparkassen), 1150 credit unions (Kreditgenossenschaften), and 200 special
purpose banks. Yet the network is sparse, with a density on the order of 0.41% of possible
links (0.61% when excluding banks with no interbank borrowing or lending).13 This sparsity
suggests the presence of a discernible structure. The German banking system thus represents
a network of interest not only in its own right, but also a⁄ords an opportunity to test whether
a network of this size can be characterized with a simple core-periphery structure.
2.2 Fitting the core-periphery model
We now ￿t the tiered structure M to the German interbank network. The ￿rst results focus on
a representative mid-sample quarter, 2003 Q2, in which 1802 banks (out of 2182) participated
in the interbank market, 1671 as intermediaries, 67 as lenders only, and 64 as borrowers only.
The fact that a large share (76.6%) of banks both lend and borrow is not unique to the German
interbank market (e.g. 66% of banks in the Portuguese interbank market do so, see Cocco et
al. (2009)). Using the procedure developed above, the optimal core was found to include 45
banks.14 This is indeed a strict subset, comprising only 2.7% of intermediaries. As expected
from Proposition 1, the core includes only those intermediaries that borrow from, and lend to,
the periphery (the lower tier). The core excludes all those banks that appear as intermediaries in
the data but play no essential role in the market. Many banks simply transform their maturity
13Further network measures for the German interbank market are reported in Craig, Fecht, and von Borstel
(2010).
14The optimal ￿t was robust across algorithms, as described in Appendix B.
15pro￿le by taking and placing funds in di⁄erent maturities, often with a single counterparty in
the core (see also Ehrmann and Worms (2004)).
This ￿nding con￿rms that the core is a strong re￿nement of the concept of intermediation. The
core here is much smaller than what is sometimes called the core in other network studies.15
By building on intermediation, our model of tiering leads to a tighter core, comprising only 2%
of banks in the network (see Figure 2). Yet the interbank market would not be a single market
without this core. The exact size of the core, however, is less important than its existence in the
￿rst place; the core would contain fewer banks, for instance, if one attached a higher penalty
on errors within the CC block than on those in other blocks.
[Figure 2: Tiering as a re￿nement of intermediation]
The total error score (4) of the optimal ￿t came to 12.2% of network links. This is an average
of 1.3 errors per bank, compared to an average of 11 links per active bank. Normalizing
instead by the dimension of the network (= n(n￿1)) shows that only 0.074% of all cells prove
inconsistent with the model M. The total number of errors reached its minimum at 2406,
comprising 683 errors (missing interbank links) within the core. The density of the core is still
66%, more than 100 times greater than the overall density of the network. The error matrix (3)
inevitably features no errors in the o⁄-diagonal blocks, consistent with the theoretical properties
derived in Proposition 1. The majority of errors (1723) therefore occur because there are direct
transactions taking place among banks in the periphery.
[Figure 3: Structural stability over time]
We track the evolution of the network on a quarterly basis from 1999Q1 through 2007Q4. The
structure we identi￿ed is highly persistent. First, the size of the core and the associated error
score are stable over time (see Figure 3). The exception is the apparent break in series in
2006Q3, where a number of mergers reduced the size from 44-46 banks prior to this date, to
35-37 banks thereafter.16 Importantly, the composition of banks within the core also remains
15For Broder et al. (2000), the core of the worldwide web is the giant strongly connected component (GSCC),
the set of pages that can reach one another through hyperlinks in both directions. Pages that can reach (or can
be reached by) the core make up the giant in-component (or out-component, respectively). Broder et al. (2000)
and subsequent studies thus use the core-periphery notion in a weaker sense of "reachability", regardless of how
many links (and thus intermediaries) it takes for one page to reach another. As a result, their core is a large
subset (28%) of all pages in the sample. Applied to the Fedwire payment network, Soram￿ki et al. (2007) ￿nd
the GSCC to comprise nearly 80% of banks in the network.
16A number of mergers among banks in the core occurred, so the new core became a subset of the old core
including the consolidated banks.




B B B B B
B B B B
@
Core Periphery Exit
Core 0:940 0:049 0:011
Periphery 0:001 0:991 0:008
Exit 0 0 1
1
C C C C C
C C C C
A
: (7)
The element PCore-Periphery represents the frequency with which core banks move to the periphery
over time. The third state (outside the sample) takes care of exits from the banking population.
The fact that the values on the diagonal are close to unity con￿rms that banks tend to remain
in the same tier (core or periphery). Estimating a separate transition matrix for each quarter
demonstrates its stability over time (Figure 4).17
[Figure 4: Transition probabilities over time]
These ￿ndings support the idea that we have identi￿ed a truly structural feature of the inter-
bank market. The persistence of this tiered structure poses a challenge to interbank theories
that build on Diamond and Dybvig (1983). If unexpected liquidity shocks were the basis for
interbank activity, should the observed linkages not be as random as the shocks? Should the
observed network not change unpredictably every period? If this were the case, it would make
little sense for central banks and regulatory authorities to run interbank simulations gauging
future contagion risks. The stability of the observed interbank structure suggests otherwise.
Robustness
Before evaluating the statistical signi￿cance of tiering, it is important to address potential
caveats. One concern relates to the way the banking statistics are collected: could the report-
ing threshold (e1.5 million or 10% of liable capital) bias the results? To test this possibility,
we performed a censoring test whereby the model was ￿tted to networks de￿ned by succes-
sively higher thresholds (from e1.5 to 100 millions, where only 50% of the value of reported
positions remained in the network). The tiered structure remained una⁄ected, and the error
score declined with each iteration. Apparently, much of the direct lending within the periphery
is in smaller denominations, which dropped out as the censoring threshold increased. Indeed,
the value of lending within the periphery accounts for less than 2% of total interbank credit.
Applying this logic in reverse suggests that one would still observe a tiered structure if the





single quarter 2006Q3 (see Figure 4).
17reporting threshold were zero, although with more direct lending within in the periphery.
A more important question is whether legal structure and public ownership determine the
network properties of the German banking system. The public savings banks have a special
relationship with their respective Landesbanken, which provide them with borrowing and lend-
ing services (Schlierbach and P￿ttner (2003)). In a less prescriptive way, credit union banks
also have a special relationship with their central cooperative banks. These pillars, and the
tiering within them, are widely noted features of the German banking system. They are dis-
cussed in the interbank context by Ehrmann and Worms (2004) and Upper and Worms (2004).
However, the observed network is not simply an institutional artifact but is rooted in economic
choices. With few exceptions, banks are free to lend and borrow from other banks throughout
the entire system ￿the data indeed show many direct linkages between periphery banks across
di⁄erent pillars. Moreover, the tiered network structure we identi￿ed predates subsequent legal
developments: Guinnane (2002) describes how the regional head institutions arose to provide
much-needed intermediation and payment services to the regionally dispersed credit unions and
savings banks in the 19th century, well before the legal developments of the postwar period.
The view that economic motives, not only institutional factors, give rise to a core-periphery
structure can also be examined by removing various segments, or their respective head insti-
tutions, from the network (Figure 5). First, the two most connected banks (head institutions)
were removed from the network along with all of their links. These two banks together main-
tain so many links that their number exceeds the total links of the next ￿fteen banks and so
could greatly a⁄ect the error score. The estimated core of the reduced network reveals a time
series of cores with essentially the same properties and banks as the original network. Other
con￿gurations of bank deletions yielded similar results.
The most drastic experiment was the entire removal of the two pillars most likely to be shaped
by legal factors, the savings banks and credit cooperatives. This was to test whether tiering
would occur in the remaining ￿and least regulated ￿segment of the German banking system.
Once again, the presence of a core remains a consistent feature, varying quite smoothly between
22 and 27 during the 36 quarters (Figure 5, solid lines). This is in spite of considerable merger
activity in this segment of the banking industry over the sample period.18
[Figure 5: Robustness checks]
A more general concern could be that our model is not su¢ ciently sophisticated to capture
the structure of the German (or any other) banking system. Our preference for the simple
core-periphery model M is that it builds on intermediation. However, the ￿tting procedure we
develop can also serve for estimating alternative market structures de￿ned by other block types.
18Interestingly, the structural break in 2006Q3 for the entire bank population is now absent; this is an
indication that it occurred within the cooperative and savings bank sectors.
18To adapt the model to the vertical pillar structure of the German banking system, for instance,
one replaces the row- and column-regular blocks in (2) by row- and column-functional blocks.19
To generalize the model to three tiers, one would extend the model to 9 blocks to include a
semi-periphery. Doing so for the German system would help distinguish regional intermediaries
from the (few) genuine core banks intermediating across the entire country.20
Signi￿cance
The core-periphery structure appears robust and stable over time, but is the ￿t su¢ ciently
tight to conclude that the interbank market is genuinely tiered? The screening test described in
Section 1.3 is easily passed: e(C￿) = 0:122 falls well below unity. That small a distance between
the network and the model demonstrates that the tiered structure is a superior benchmark than
the alternative, which comprised only a periphery.
In the second step, we test this score against the error distributions from ￿tting random net-
works. We generated 1000 Erd￿s-RØnyi random graphs and 1000 scale-free networks of the
same dimension and density as the German interbank network (n = 1802;d = 0:61%). We
then ￿tted M to each realization, and traced out the distributions Fe against which to assess
the error score of the German network. Figure 6 shows the histograms of the normalized error
scores (4) for each class of random networks separately.21
The error score distributions show that both classes of random networks exhibit tight statistical
properties.22 The Erd￿s-RØnyi random graphs show error scores highly concentrated around
0.983. This is so close to unity that there is really no value in identifying a core in random
networks. Importantly, even the best-￿tting realization of 1000 networks produced an error
score of 0.981, more than 8 times that of the German interbank network. The scale-free
networks come much closer.23 This was to be expected, since scale-free networks are known to
produce hubs that characterize many real networks, including interbank markets (Boss et al.
(2004)). Even so, none of the 1000 realizations of scale-free networks produced an error score
of less than 0.204, a distance that remains by a factor of 1.8 larger than that of the German
19A row-functional block (Doreian et al. (2005)) in our context implies that every bank in the periphery
relates to a single bank in the core.
20One indication suggestive of a three-tier system is the simple experiment of ￿tting the model once more
on the subnetwork among core banks. This delivers an "inner core" of 28 banks with an error of 221 (17% of
links).
21See Appendix B on the robustness checks we used to ascertain that the test distributions re￿ ect the intrinsic
randomness of networks, rather than stochastic output from an unreliable procedure.
22Scale-free networks consistently produced cores of size 55-57. Random graphs featured cores of size 17 or
18, in 86% and 14% of cases, respectively.
23Interestingly, the Monte Carlo experiments produced binning into four distinct error score classes (red
in Figure 6). We made considerable e⁄orts to ensure that these were not local minima, especially for the
clusters around higher error scores (see Appendix B). More work is needed to uncover the reasons behind this
phenomenon.
19network.
[Figure 6: German Fit against simulated Error Score Densities]
The goodness of ￿t for the German interbank network thus lies outside any conceivable per-
centile of the error distribution for both classes of random networks. We can therefore reject
the hypothesis that random networks produce the extent of tiering evidenced by the German
banking system. Put di⁄erently, the core-periphery model is a much better description of the
German interbank network than of random networks. We conclude that the tiering observed
among German banks does not result from standard random processes. Indeed, the statistical
approach to network formation is ill-suited for social and economic networks, which are the
result of purposeful activity by agents weighing the costs and bene￿ts of forming links (Goyal
(2007) and Jackson (2008)). One should therefore expect di⁄erent kinds of banks to build
systematically di⁄erent patterns of linkages ￿a direction we explore next.
3 Interbank tiering and money center banks
The concept of tiering captures a structural quality of the interbank market that allocates
banks into a core and a periphery. As is characteristic for network analysis, this allocation is
derived from the pattern of linkages alone: network statistics are calculated disregarding any
other information on individual nodes. But one would expect that a bank￿ s network position
would be related to bank-speci￿c features, such as its size, location, business model, or funding
sources. We regard this unexplored link as a promising bridge between banking theory and
network analysis, essential for a better understanding of the formation of interbank networks.
3.1 What makes a core bank?
In this section, we explore whether individual bank features help explain how banks position
themselves in the interbank market. In particular, what kind of banks make up the core of
the network? To test whether a bank￿ s membership in the core can be predicted by bank-
speci￿c features, we assembled balance sheet variables for the 1802 active banks in the German
interbank network in the mid-sample quarter 2003 Q2, using the monthly banking data collected
by the Bundesbank￿ s statistics department (monatliche Bilanzstatistik).24 These variables serve
as regressors in a probit regression, where the binary dependent variable is core membership:
24This test is in the spirit of the industrial organization approach to banking (surveyed in Degryse et al.
(2009)), but focuses on overall market structure rather than on individual bank performance.
20bi = 1 if bank i was found to be part of the core in the previous section, and bi = 0 otherwise,
prob(bi = 1) = ￿(x
0
i￿):
The ￿rst column of Table 1 reports the simplest regression using bank size as the sole explana-
tory variable. The log of total bank assets is highly signi￿cant; a marginal increase in size from
the average balance sheet of e230 million raises the probability of belonging to the core by a
sixth of a percent. Indeed, size is a fairly reliable classi￿er. The average size of banks in the
core is 51 times that of banks in the periphery. Hence, large banks tend to be in the core, while
small banks are found in the periphery of the interbank network.
This intuitive result is in line with earlier studies on interbank markets. For instance, Cocco et
al. (2009) ￿nd that small interbank borrowers rely more on relationships, preferably with larger
banks. Interbank markets typically have natural lenders and borrowers (Stigum and Crescenzi
(2007)); in the federal funds market, small banks tend to turn over surplus funds to large banks
that distribute or invest the funds (Ho and Saunders (1985), Allen and Saunders (1986), Bech
and Atalay (2010)). Further back in US monetary history, small rural banks cleared at money
centers that, in turn, were dealing with each other and with the large New York banks, a process
known as reserve pyramiding (White (1983)). These observations are all consistent with our
view that interbank markets have a tiered structure.
[Table 1: Core membership and bank-speci￿c variables]
Is the importance of bank size for network position an expression of economies of scale and
scope? This question should be addressed with a de￿nition of size that is unrelated to a
bank￿ s interbank activity. The intermediary function that core banks perform, by borrowing
and lending in the interbank market, of course contributes to their reported balance sheet
size. We thus compute the intrinsic size of a bank as (the logarithm of) total assets excluding
interbank lending. This measure captures all positions relating to the bank￿ s other business
lines, including that of a¢ liated entities consolidated into its balance sheet. Intrinsic size, when
used alone, delivers a poor ￿t and the coe¢ cient ￿although signi￿cant ￿is too small to identify
core banks at the default threshold (column 1b). The variable remains signi￿cant but adds
little explanatory power when used jointly with others (not reported). Economies of scale and
scope per se seem to play a limited role in explaining a bank￿ s position in the interbank market.
This may re￿ ect a degree of specialization among banks: some very large universal banks focus
their other business to a greater extent on capital markets and on international activity, which
lies beyond the observed (domestic) network.
The single most e⁄ective regressor will be one that takes network data into account. Column
2a shows that a bank￿ s connectedness predicts quite reliably whether or not it is in the core,
where we measure connectedness by betweenness centrality, a concept borrowed from sociology
21(Freeman (1979)). Betweenness is the probability with which a node lies on the shortest path
between any two unconnected nodes. The probit regression makes clear that connectedness
predicts core membership better than does bank size. This is not surprising when one recog-
nizes tiering as a "group version" of betweenness: the core comprises the banks that jointly
intermediate between the periphery, so a bank that helps to link pairs of unconnected banks
also contributes to the core performing this role for the market as a whole. More intriguing is
the presence of outliers: for reasons of specialization, some very large banks were found to be
far less connected than their size and presence in the core would suggest. This touches on the
open question of whether "too-big-to-fail" or "too-connected-to-fail" is the relevant criterion
for ￿nancial stability.
To examine this link directly, we estimate each bank￿ s systemic importance using the approach
taken in the interbank contagion literature. Systemic importance is measured by the damage
a bank￿ s failure in￿ icts upon the rest of the system (e.g. Upper and Worms (2004)). Such
simulations often require a loss-given-default (LGD) which is generally unknown. Craig, Fecht,
and von Borstel (2010) proceed to solve for the LGD that would be required for a bank￿ s failure
to cause a systemic crisis (de￿ned as 25% of system assets in default). The variable systemic
importance used in regression 2b is the inverse of this value, because more important banks
bring down the system already at smaller LGDs. Systemic importance is highly correlated with
a bank￿ s network position: it is extremely unlikely that a systemically important bank would
not be in the core, as indicated by the low rate of false core predictions, Prob(cjP). But the
moderate ￿t also suggests that a bank￿ s position in the network is something that goes beyond
its systemic importance.
In practice, a major problem for central banks and regulators is that the bilateral interbank
exposures for conducting network analysis and assessing systemic risk are unavailable in most
countries. Is it possible to identify the core of the interbank market with a regression that uses
only individual balance sheet variables? Columns 3 (and 1) present probit regressions excluding
those regressors for which network data are required (those shaded in Table 1). Interbank
liabilities help predict core membership quite well, although total bank size performed a little
better, in part due to economies of scale and scope (column 3a). However, the prediction can
be further improved by focusing on the size of interbank intermediation activity. The variable
intermediation measures the volume each bank intermediates, by taking the minimum between
its borrowing and lending in the interbank market. (It would be zero for banks that only
borrow or lend, regardless of the volume.) Column 3b shows that this variable predicts core
membership nearly as reliably as connectedness, and better than systemic importance, without
requiring the bilateral data necessary for these two regressors.
Finally, we include the aforementioned variables jointly to examine their respective explanatory
power. In regression 4a, it is clear that each regressor remains signi￿cant in concert with the
22others: bank size, betweenness, and systemic importance all contribute signi￿cantly to explain-
ing which banks form the core. Each variable adds a facet to core membership that is related
to ￿but distinct from ￿the other two. The ￿nal regression, 4b, indicates that the explanatory
power of systemic importance falls (to 8% signi￿cance) when interbank intermediation and be-
tweenness are included together, suggesting that a bank￿ s interbank position and the volume
it intermediates in the interbank market jointly contain most of the information embodied in
systemic importance.
All in all, the results of Table 1 show that network position is predictable by bank-speci￿c
features. Banks are in the core because they are well-connected, both when measured by
connectedness (betweenness centrality) and in terms of contagion (systemic importance); they
are also in the core due to their ability to carry out large transactions, as measured by their
balance sheet size or by the volume of interbank intermediation they perform. None of these
concepts by itself fully explains core membership, but each adds to the qualities that make up
a core bank.
A bank in the core of a tiered interbank market can therefore be regarded as a money center
bank. This term is generally associated with large banks that dominate wholesale activity in
money markets; in addition to running traditional banking operations, money center banks
provide clearing and correspondent banking services, and act as dealers in a broad range of
markets, including government securities, FX, derivatives, and o⁄shore markets (Stigum and
Crescenzi (2007)). As money market makers, they do interdealer business among themselves,
inside the spread they quote to other, more peripheral banks. As such, money center banks
are those intermediaries occupying the special network position we identify as the core. In
this network sense, money center banks play a central role among banks, in dealing among
themselves and tying in the periphery.
3.2 Concluding remarks: bridging two literatures
In relating network position to bank-speci￿c features, our paper bridges two literatures. The
banking literature, elegantly summarized by Freixas and Rochet (2008), examines individual
bank incentives with no concern for how banks position themselves in a larger network. The
literature on network formation, on the other hand, often relies on random processes from sta-
tistical mechanics (e.g. Newman et al. (2006)). Even recent game-theoretic models of strategic
network formation (Goyal (2007) and Jackson (2008) provide excellent surveys) disregard the
features of individual nodes. In our view, this severely limits what such models can predict
in the way of network formation. For instance, in some network formation games the pure
star emerges as the unique equilibrium architecture (Bala and Goyal (2000), Goyal and Vega-
Redondo (2007), Hojman and Szeidl (2008)); but since these theories cannot predict which
23node will form the center of the network, they must be regarded, in a sense, as indeterminate.
Our ￿ndings suggests that bank-speci￿c features help explain how banks position themselves in
the interbank market, as evidenced by the regression results. Balance sheet variables also help
predict interbank relations in other studies (Cocco et al. (2009)), with implications for overall
market structure. As tiering is not random but behavioral, there are economic reasons why the
banking system organizes itself around a core of money center banks. The strong correlation
with size suggests the presence of ￿xed costs, possibly with economies of scale and scope. To
better understand ￿nancial networks, we argue that the way forward should focus more on the
features of the nodes that make up the network. In the context of banking, this provides clues
for theoretical modeling e⁄orts as to how di⁄erent banks choose to make network connections.
A class of recent banking models does take into account the fact that interbank markets operate
as networks rather than centralized exchanges. Allen and Gale (2000) propose a framework in
which banks of di⁄erent regions (or sectors) face opposite liquidity shocks. This provides an
incentive for banks to insure each other ex ante, which can be done through interbank deposits.
(In a related model, Leitner (2005) demonstrates that interbank deposits help induce banks to
bail each other out.) Similarly, Babus (2009) shows that it is optimal for banks to exchange
deposits with all banks facing opposite liquidity shocks.25 However, this approach predicts
dense networks, contrary to the core-periphery structure we detected for the German interbank
network. That core-periphery structure is also highly persistent, which clashes with the view
that random liquidity shocks are the basis for understanding interbank activity. Moreover, the
interbank market in these models is essentially ￿at ￿there is no role for intermediation. Banks
are identical ex ante, including in the way they connect to each other. There is no reason in
these models why banks, the main intermediaries in the economy, would build yet another layer
of intermediation between them.
To explain the tiered structures we explored in this paper, a model would require some asym-
metry or specialization. Two existing models do so by assumption. In the two-tier bank model
of Qi (2008), the "correspondent" bank is assumed to be di⁄erent: its ability to borrow cost-
lessly makes other banks use it as a liquidity pool, much like a central bank. However, the
central bank is not the only interbank intermediary, as is apparent from the German interbank
network. Freixas et al. (2000) provide an example of such a case, obtained by assuming that
all travelers pass through a single location.26 The bank located there receives and extends lines
vis-￿-vis banks in all other locations (which are not connected to each other). Though both set-
tings are constructed rather than derived, they lead to pure star networks with a single money
center bank at the core. The core-periphery network is a generalization of the star network
25It is unclear whether this theory predicts a network of interbank deposits. Other instruments are available
for implementing risk-sharing, including insurance contracts, derivatives, and credit lines.
26Consumers of di⁄erent regions face uncertainty about where to consume. Interbank credit lines between
banks in these regions help economize on reserves, so travelers need not move any goods or cash.
24with several interconnected centers. To better understand the formation of such networks, it




Part a) To show that the presence of intermediaries is necessary, consider a network N of
dimension n in which the are no intermediaries in the sense of De￿nition 1. Banks are either
lenders (￿ in number), or borrowers (￿ in number), or neither of the two (n ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0).
We ￿rst show that the latter group, the unattached banks, must be in the periphery, because
each unattached bank causes fewer errors in (3) relative to the model (2) when allocated to
the periphery. To see this, suppose there is an unattached bank among the c banks in the
core. This causes exactly 2(c ￿ 1) errors in the CC block, and (n ￿ c) errors in each of the
blocks CP and PC of (3). The same bank placed in the periphery would cause no errors in
CC (nor in PP), but could add up to 2(c ￿ 1) errors for expanding the CP and PC blocks (if
all remaining core banks are not linked to the periphery). Switching the unattached bank from
core to periphery thus leads to a net reduction in the total number of errors of at least 2(n￿c),
which is always positive (and zero if the periphery is empty). The move thus weakly dominates
for the ￿rst unattached, and strictly dominates for each subsequent unattached bank and every
combination of unattached banks. Therefore, it is optimal to allocate all unattached banks to
the periphery.
We proceed to show that the same argument holds for the remaining core banks, which must
be either lenders or borrowers (not both). Suppose that ￿C lenders and ￿C borrowers are in the
core (so that ￿C + ￿C = c, with 0 ￿ ￿C ￿ ￿, 0 ￿ ￿C ￿ ￿). Without loss of generality, reorder
the nodes in each tier such that the lenders appear ￿rst, followed by the borrowers and the
unattached. This divides each of the four blocks as shown in (8). The absence of intermediaries
implies many zero blocks, since lenders borrow from noone, borrowers lend to noone, and the













Now, the number of errors of this (arbitrary) allocation can be reduced as long as there are banks
left in the core. Applying (3) to (8) shows that the CC block generates at least ￿C (￿C ￿ 1) +
￿C (￿C ￿ 1)+￿C￿C errors, the number of zero entries in the top left block, and more if the sub-
block ￿C￿C is not complete with ones. The CP block (top right) comprises at least ￿C(n￿￿C￿
26￿C) errors, where the term in brackets is the dimension of the periphery (of which ￿P ￿ ￿￿￿C
are borrowers). Likewise, the PC block counts at least ￿C(n ￿ ￿C ￿ ￿C) errors, and more if
the sub-block ￿P￿C is not column-regular as required by (2). This allocation thus produces,
for these three blocks, at least
(n ￿ 1)(￿C + ￿C) + ￿C￿C (9)
errors, plus the number of nonzeros in the sub-block ￿P￿P, denoted by #(￿P￿P). If all banks
were placed in the periphery instead, the errors would equal the number of nonzeros, which
cannot exceed ￿￿: Expanding ￿￿ (using ￿ ￿ ￿C + ￿P) shows that (9) exceeds #(￿￿) provided
￿C [(n ￿ 1) ￿ ￿P] + ￿C [(n ￿ 1) ￿ ￿P] > 0: (10)
The terms in square brackets are always positive when there is one or more unattached banks
in the network (implying (n ￿ 1) > ￿ + ￿); in that case, the error score can always be reduced
by placing all banks in the periphery, i.e. until ￿C = ￿C = 0. If there are no unattached banks,
the same conclusion holds for all but one peculiar network for which the net gain in (10) would
be zero.27 Since moving all banks to the periphery is strictly dominant for all networks (and
weakly dominant for one peculiar network), the absence of intermediaries implies an empty
core.
To show su¢ ciency, i.e. that a network containing intermediaries gives rise to a non-empty core,
assume to the contrary that the core is empty and at least one bank, say bank i, intermediates.
Since all banks are in the periphery, the presence of i contributes at least two errors to PP.
Allowing bank i to form a core by itself removes both errors without producing any new errors
in the three new blocks of (3). By the same argument, adding more intermediaries to N can
expand, but cannot reduce, the size of the core. Thus the presence of intermediaries produces
a core.
What remains to be checked is that the periphery does not vanish. The core is potentially
largest when all banks lend to each other: placing n ￿ 1 banks in the core will minimize the
error score to zero. The same score can be also attained by moving all n banks to the core,
which would leave no periphery. However, one missing bilateral link is su¢ cient (not necessary)
to guarantee that a periphery always exists. Suppose banks i and j are not connected to each
other (Nij = Nji = 0). The two zeros contribute two errors in CC if both banks remain in the
core. Moving i or j jointly to the periphery yields a net gain: the two zeros are now in the PP
block where they do not count as errors, and the CP and PC blocks that this move created
27If a single bank lends to all other banks in the system (￿P = n￿1, and ￿C = 0), then the total error score
is una⁄ected by whether that lender is in the core or the periphery. (The same holds for the single-borrower
case, where ￿P = n ￿ 1, and ￿C = 0.)
27cannot contain more errors than they did as part of the CC block.28A single missing link is
therefore su¢ cient to sustain a periphery even when all other banks lend to each other.
Part b) The proof that all core banks are intermediaries is by contradiction. Suppose a bank
that does not intermediate is in the core. We show that the distance-minimizing procedure will
place this bank in the periphery. A bank that does not intermediate has no outgoing interbank
links, or no incoming links, or no links at all. We need to consider only one case, that of zero
out￿ degree.29 First compute how many errors this bank, say i, causes as a member of the core.
The core consists of c banks including i, and we use (3) to aggregate errors in the four blocks
delineated by the single lines in the matrix below. Links with core banks never cause errors, so
we can focus on the missing links. By not lending at all, bank i contributes at least (c￿1) errors
to CC, plus (n ￿ c) errors to CP for violating row-regularity in that block. This contribution
to the error score, n ￿ 1, is a minimum value: it is higher if bank i does not borrow from all
other core banks, or if it does not borrow from the periphery.
CC 0 CP
1
0 0 0 0 0
0
PC 1 PP
Moving bank i to the periphery will permit a net reduction in the number of errors. This
move changes the four blocks as indicated by the double lines in the matrix. The CC block
shrinks, transferring its column i to CP and row i to PC, respectively; and PP expands, taking
column i from PC and row i from CP, respectively. The ￿rst transfer removes all the errors
that i had caused in CC and may add new errors to CP and PC that are strictly fewer in
number than those saved CC. (There is one possible exception where the net gain reaches zero.
This occurs only if none of the remaining core banks borrow from any periphery banks (c ￿ 1
errors), and either some core banks do not lend to the periphery or bank i borrows from all
core banks.) The second transfer also delivers a net improvement: the (n ￿ c) errors formerly
in CP no longer count as errors when moved to PP, but column i now in PP may add errors
if it contains ones; the net reduction in errors is again strictly positive, except in the one case
28If each core bank is connected to at least one bank among i and j, the new CP and PC blocks will contain
no errors at all. If some core banks are attached to neither i nor j, then the corresponding rows in CP (columns
in PC) will contain as many errors as was the case when these rows (columns) were part of the CC block. This
continues to hold even if all core banks are unconnected to this pair of banks (then i and j are unattached and
best put in the periphery, as shown above). Moving i and j to the periphery saves at least two errors in each
case.
29The case of zero in￿ degree is symmetric. That unattached banks go to the periphery was shown in part a).
28where bank i happens to borrow from all (n ￿ c) banks in the periphery.
Combining these error reductions shows that the distance-minimizing procedure will move bank
i to the periphery, contradicting the initial claim that a nonintermediary can be in the core.
(The one exception for which there is weak dominance can occur only if i borrows from all banks,
or some other core banks do not intermediate between periphery banks, a case considered in
what follows.) Thus all core banks are intermediaries.
The converse, that all intermediaries are also core banks, does not hold. Suppose bank i is
in the core but intermediates only among core banks. It is straightforward to show, with the
approach just used, that moving i to the periphery always produces a net reduction of at least
2(n ￿ c) errors (which had been in CP and PC but no longer count as errors when part of
PP). Hence, not every intermediary is a core bank.
We generalize this case by showing that a core bank that does not lend to (or does not borrow
from) the periphery will not be in the core. Suppose bank i does not lend to any bank in the
periphery. Its presence in the core contributes (n￿c) errors to CP and x ￿ 0 errors to CC for
any missing links with other core banks. Moving bank i to the periphery again leads to a net
reduction in errors. The argument follows exactly the one just advanced for nonintermediaries,
the only di⁄erence being that the number of errors involved in the ￿rst transfer, now x, need not
exceed (c ￿ 1). The result carries through that moving i to the periphery is strictly dominant,
again with one exception where it is weakly dominant. The analogous case of a bank that
does not borrow from the periphery can be shown by symmetry. Therefore, the core excludes
intermediaries that do not lend to (or do not borrow from) the periphery.
Appendix B: Computational methods
As stated, ￿tting a core-periphery model to a real-world network is a large-scale problem in
combinatorial optimization, which we solve by means of a sequential algorithm. This way, the
search for the optimal core leads to a solution in polynomial time, rather than in exponential
time (2n) required by exhaustive search. Section 1.3 described two versions of the algorithm that
we designed for this task, both running in polynomial time (order n1).30 In our application to
the German network (n = 1802), the algorithm converged in 70 seconds on a standard IntelCore
2 duo processor (2.4GHz).
For NP-hard problems of this dimension, it is not possible to prove that the solution returned
by any procedure is indeed the global optimum. We therefore performed several robustness
checks to dispel doubts. First, we backtested our algorithm against existing blockmodeling
30The MATLAB code is available upon request from the authors.
29routines, and obtained the same solutions for small example networks.31 We also tested that
the algorithm ￿nds the optimum for cases where the true solution is known: we generated
arti￿cial networks (of the same dimension and density as the German system) with a perfectly
tiered structure, for which the minimum error score (4) must be zero, by construction. The
algorithm consistently returned the correct set of core banks with zero errors. Second, we know
from Proposition 1 that any solution returning nonzero elements on the o⁄-diagonal of the error
matrix E cannot be an optimum ￿in practice, the procedure never returned solutions failing
this criterion. However, as this is a necessary (not a su¢ cient) condition, one cannot rely on this
test alone to rule out all local optima. Our third and main robustness check therefore consisted
of repeated application and careful comparison of the results generated by two algorithms (see
section 1.3).
This was straightforward to do for the single application to the German interbank network, and
reliably yielded the solution reported in the text. To prepare the thousands of runs necessary
for hypothesis testing, we compared the error scores calculated with simulated annealing pro-
grams with various "cooling" parameters and many di⁄erent initial partitions, with the greedy
algorithms using di⁄erent initial conditions. For avoiding local optima it turned out to be help-
ful to start the greedy algorithm su¢ ciently far from an approximate solution to give it time
to converge to the error-minimizing core. The best simulated annealing algorithms gave error
scores very close to a greedy algorithm with initial partitions that assigned a random half of
the banks to the core. The local optima that did occur were easily identi￿ed by their extremely
high error score, which would fall to the normal range when ￿tting the same network again.
The distributions shown in Figure 6, using the greedy algorithm with random initial partitions,
o⁄ered consistently the minimum error score, always close to the best solution of any of the
algorithms we tried. We performed robustness checks on the algorithm to make sure that the
initial conditions and parameters were consistent with generating the minimum error scores
for both types of random networks (see Appendix B). The core sizes did not vary between the
algorithms, although the error scores did ￿ uctuate in a narrow range for di⁄erent initial con-
ditions. Taken together, these robustness tests assured us that the distributions generated for
the hypothesis tests re￿ ect the intrinsic randomness of random networks, rather than stochastic
output from an unreliable procedure.32
31The software Pajek (Batagelj et al. (2003)) implements generalized blockmodeling for networks of up to
256 nodes.
32The random networks were generated in Matlab, using the routine of Muchnik et al. (2007) for obtaining
directed scale-free networks.
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Figure 1: Stylized example of an interbank market. The left panel illustrates a perfectly tiered 
interbank structure in a stylized interbank market comprising 8 banks. The arrows represent the 
direction of credit exposure, e.g. bank D lends to A. The middle and right panels depict examples of 







 # banks = 2182 
 # active = 1802 
Figure 2: The core as a refinement of intermediation. This Venn diagram 
illustrates the relationships between various sets of banks in the German 
interbank market. The majority of banks intermediate, yet only a small subset 
of intermediaries qualify as core banks. 
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Core size (left axis)
Error score (right axis)
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Figure 3: Structural stability over time. The figure shows the size of the estimated core 
(number of banks, left axis) and the total error score (expressed as a percentage of links 















































Mergers among core banks 
(absorbed banks leave
the sample)
Figure 4: Transition probabilities over time. This figure shows the transition 
probabilities for each quarter over the sample period (1999 Q1 – 2007 Q4). The lines 
trace out the two top rows in equation (7) over time. For instance, prob(C|P), shown in 










































































































































Core size (two head institutions removed, left axis)
Core size (two pillars removed, left axis)
Error score (two head institutions removed, right axis)
Error score (two pillars removed, right axis)
Core size Error score (%)
 
Figure 5: Robustness checks. The figure shows the number of banks in the estimated 
core (in blue, left axis) and the total error score (in red, right axis) over time for two 
different experiments. In the first, shown with dashed lines, the two most connected 
banks (head institutions) are removed from the network. In the second experiment, 
shown with solid lines, all saving banks and credit cooperatives (pillars) are removed.  
 




























Figure 6: German fit against simulated error score densities. This figure compares the 
total error score from fitting the tiering model to the German interbank network (12.2% 
of links, shown as an arrow) to the normalized error scores, as defined as in 
equation (4), from fitting two types of random networks of the same dimension. The red 
bars show the histogram of error scores from fitting 1000 scale-free networks, whereas 
the blue bars represent the histrogram from fitting 1000 Erdös-Rényi random graphs.   
 
Table 1:  Core membership and bank-specific variables 
The table reports the results of probit regressions testing whether network position can be predicted by 
individual bank balance sheet variables. The binary variable core membership takes the value 1 for banks that 
were determined to be in the core, and 0 for the remaining banks. It is regressed on a constant and the 
regressors shown in the rows, which rely only on individual bank data (except for the shaded variables, which 
require the network data). The columns show the different regressions, each comprising 1802 observations. 
The cells show the maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients. The marginal effects are shown in 
parentheses, evaluated at the multivariate point of means. Significance is denoted by *(5%) and **(1%). 
Bank size is the natural logarithm of total assets (in Є thousands plus 1); Intrinsic size excludes interbank claims from 
total assets before taking the logarithm. Interbank liabilities is the logarithm of (interbank liabilities+1). The fit with 
interbank liabilities was slightly better than that with interbank assets (not reported). Intermediation is the 
logarithm of interbank liabilities that a bank in turn lends out on the interbank market, i.e. Ln  (min  { interbank 
assets, interbankl iabilities } +1).  Connectedness is normalized betweenness centrality (Freeman (1979)). Systemic 
importance of an institution is measured here as the (inverse) loss-given-default necessary such that the failure of the 
institution leads to a systemic crisis (a quarter of the banking system in default). The probabilities in the final rows 
are evaluated at the default threshold of 0.5. Prob(c|C) = probability (in %) that a bank predicted to be in the core 
is indeed in the core (=100-Prob(p|C)). Prob(c|P) =  rate of false core predictions. 
Regressors  1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 
Bank size  0.903** 
(0.0014) 
      0.361** 
(0.0821)   
Intrinsic size    0.149**  
(0.0073)        
Interbank liabilities       0.667** 
(0.0006)     




  0.455** 
(0.0557) 
Connectedness      3962** 




Systemic importance        4.737** 





2  0.573 0.073 0.654 0.475 0.542 0.579 0.736 0.765 
% correctly classified  98.5% 97.5% 98.8% 98.5% 98.0% 98.7% 99.0% 99.1% 
Prob(c |C) core correct  48.9% 0% 60.0%  42.2%  42.2% 51.1% 68.9% 71.1% 
Prob(c |P) core false  0.17%  0%  0.17% 0.06% 0.57% 0.06% 0.17% 0.23% 
 
 
 